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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
. ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
~-vs.

-

POLLLY THOMPSON, also known as
POLLY THOMPSON BRITTAIN;
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMP ANY;
MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK; A. P. NEILSON
and LILLIE M. NEILSON, his wife;
GERHARDT DRECHSEL and ERNA A.
DRECHSEL, his wife; BEN H. DAVIS
and DOROTHY M. DAVIS, his wife;
DONALD W. LAYTON and HELEN D.
LAYTON, his wife; MARY IZETTA
OGDEN McHALE; and PHYLLIS
LUCILLE MOORE,
Defendants.

Civil
No.10308

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY and
MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK,
Appellants,
-vs.-

A. P NEILSON and LILLIE M. NEILSON,
his wife,

Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
1:-\TATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action was initiated by the State of Utah to
acqntie certain tracts of land through condemnation for
interstate highway purposes. The Appellants and Re-
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spondents both claim to be owners of a certain trart
land involved in said condemnation action.

Iii

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court on December 29, 1964, entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and .JutlK
ment holding that the Respondents, A. P. Neilson ancl
Lillie M. Neilson, his wife, are entitled to judgment from
the State of Utah for the appraised value of the property
involved herein.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellants seek a reversal of the judgme11t of
the District Court and a judgment in their favor as n
matter of law to the effect that they are the owners of
the property involved herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was initiated on or about April 4, 1963,
by the State of Utah, by and through its State Road
Commission, to acquire certain tracts of land throngli
condemnation (Tr. 1). Of the numerous tracts of land
designated in the State's Complaint, the only one nt'
concern in this case is designated ''Parcel No. 02-3:
47D :T" which is located in Salt Lake County, State nf
Utah, and described as all of Lots 19 aud 20, Block Cl,
Irving Park Addition, Salt Lake City Survey.
There is no dispute between the parties herein that
the appraised value offered by the State represents tLi'
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value of said property (Tr. 26, 29). There is
,: .1 1:-;pute, however, between the Respondents and Ap11111n11ts as to the recipient of said appraised value.

'I'he Appellants' alleged ownership of the property
is baser1 upon the following chain of title. Jacob I. Al!rnbach, deceased, was vested with a fee simple title to
,aid property at the time of his death (Tr. 40). Followinci: l1is den th, Harriet Allenbach, widow of said Jacob I.
1\l11 11hach, executed a quitclaim deed to Valley InvestrnC"1t! Company, dated July 7, 1950, which Investment
i'ompauy in turn executed a quitclaim deed to Utah
J'o1rc·r & Light Company, dated January 10, 1955, (Tr.
40). Since the conveyance from Valley Investment
('ompany, Utah Power & Light Company has paid taxes
assl'ssed on said property within the requirements of
the Public Utilities Act of the State of Utah, (Tr. 41).
1

'l1here is no evidence that Harriet Allenbach was
rested with fee title at the time she executed the quitrlaim deed to Valley Investment Company. Appellants
offered no evidence as to whether her husband, Jacob I.
.\lle11hach, died testate or intestate or whether or not he
left any heirs in addition to his wife (Tr. 40).
'l1he Respondents derive their title to said property
Ii!· virtue of a deed from Salt Lake County dated March
1~, 1958, which deed transferred the county's interest in
'Rid land, which interest was obtained from tax sales
f,,,. tl1e years 1916, 1917 and 1932, and the issuance of an
auditor's tax deed, which instruments were promptly re-
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corded (Tr. 40, 41). The affidavit of the county audi!rir
was not attached to the assessment rolls for the years llir·
taxes were delinquent (Tr. 40, 41).
Since the conveyance on March 12, 1958, from Salt
Lake County up to the commencement of the State's erindemnation action on April 4, 1963, Respondents hay~
paid when due all general property taxes assessed by said
county (Tr. 41).
The property involved herein is not fen red or improved, and neither the Appellants nor the Respondents have, at any time, been in actual physical poRses:-:i 011
of said property (Tr. 41).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE APPELLANTS HA VE ESTABLISHED
NO RIGHT IN OR TITLE TO THE PROPERTY INVOLVED HEREIN.
The Appellants' alleged record ownership to the
property in question is based upon a quitclaim deed
from Harriet Allenbach to Valley Investment Company,
which Company in turn executed a quitclaim deed to
Utah Power & Light Company. It is of import, aml
Respondents deem it controlling, that in regard to the
first link of Appellants' chain of title, i.e., quitclaim <1eeii
by Harriet Allenbach to Valley Investment Comyrnn~"
there was no evidence introduced by Appellants in tlwir
attempt to quiet title in themselves that Harriet Allen-
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Jiaeli was nstcJ with the fee title at the time of the
r·\t'<'ntiou

of saiJ quitclaim deeJ.

rrhis defect is not cured by the fact that her husband,
Jacob I. Allenbach, was vested with fee simple title
at the time of his death, since no eYidence was intro1]necd concerning any probate proceedings, whether he
died tc8tate or intestate, or whether or not he left any
ltf'irs in addition to his wife.
Appellants have failed to establish that Harriet
,\llenbach possessed any interest in the property whate1·er at the time she executed the quitclaim deed to Valley Imcstment Company. There is therefore no evidence
from which the court could conclude that Appellants are
the owners of any interest in the premises or that Appellants lrnYe any standing to attack Respondents record
t[tlr. It is respectfully submitted that Appellants on
the hasis of the record below were not under any circum3(anccs rntitled to attack Respondents title or to receive
compensation as the owners of the real estate.
POINT IL
THE RESPONDENTS POSSESS A VALID
TAX TITLE TO THE PROPERTY INVOLVED HEREIN, AND THE APPELLANTS ARE BARRED FROM ATTACKING
SUCH TITLE.
A8suming arguendo that Appellants are record title
l1olc1crs, they are barred from asserting their claim to
Uw property involved herein under Section 78-12-5.2 and
iS-19_,-J.c
- 3' U •CA
• '' 19r::3
;) •
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Section 78-12-5.2 precludes the bringing of an artion
for the recovery of real property against the holder of a
tax title after the expiration of four years from the date
of conveyance under 'ivhich the tax title was acquirPd
unless the owner of the legal title has occupied or been
in actual possession of the property within the four-year
period. Section 78-12-5.3 defines a tax title as being any
title, whether valid or not, which has been derived through
tax sale proceedings whereby the property is reliend
from a tax lien.
In Pender v. Alix, 11 Utah 2d 58, 354 P. 2d 1066, the
tax title holder intervened in a suit by the record owner
to quiet title. The Court, applying the provisions of Section 78-12-5.2, and citing Ha1tisen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2(1
310, 283 P. 2d 884, and Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 2cl
359, 313 P. 2d 814, aff'd on rehearing 8 Utah 2d 348, 33±
P. 2d 757, as controlling, held that the record owner "wa'
vulnerable to the four-year limitation statute .... "
In Hansen v. Morris, supra, this Court sustained
the constitutionality of Sections 78-12-5.1 and 5.3. This
case involved a quiet title suit brought by the plaintiff
against the record owner. Against the record 01mer\
assertion that the statutory steps necessary to perfc2t
a valid title were not accomplished, the Court stated:
"It appears obvious that such sections were e;i
acted to eliminate the objections pointed out 1n
the Toronto case, and were intended to prerr;1t
raising of def ens es based on failure to comply
with statutory steps leading down the long road
traversable in perfecting tax titles, unless one
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daiming a better title assert his rights within
tour years after a document of transfer, valid on
its face, has been executed and delivered 'in the
course of a statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied against * * * property
whereby the property is relieved from a tax
lien.' ''
''In holding such sections [78-12-5.1 and 5.3]
valid, we can see no merit in any argument to the
effect that if any of the statutory steps necessary
to perfect a tax title have not been taken, such as
failure to give notice of sale, failure of the auditor
to execute affidavits, etc., compels the conclusion
that title remains in the record owner, hence no
title passes, hence any claim by the county and/ or
its grantee by tax deed is invalid, hence the
statute of limitations does not apply."
In Peterson v. Callister, supra, this Court was again
called upon to interpret the statute of limitations designed to validate tax titles. This case involved a quiet
title action by the tax title holder against the successor
in interest of the record owner. The Court held that
the defense of irregularities in a tax sale proceeding, one
of which >vas the failure to attach an auditor's affidavit
tn the asse;;;sment rolls, was not available to the suc~~~sor in interest of the record owner by Yirtue of Title
iS-12-0.1 and 5.3. In so holding, the Court stated:

"We agree with the defendant that title technieally may not have passed, but the plaintiff can
prevail here even with an invalid tax title hy
virtue of Titles 78-12-5.1 and 5.3, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Plaintiff had a tax title, valid or
iiot, which was derived through a sale and conveyance of the property in the course of a statu-
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tory proceeding for the liquidation of a tax wh· ·l
h"
IC]
. d
.
.
h a d b een 1evie
agamst it, w ich tax was reliew·il
b;y the transfer. Defer:dant did not have poR~eR
s10n thereof at any time during the statuto,
"d"m wl"hh
peno.
nc
e must ~iave occupied the proI\;_
1
erty m order to protect his record title.''
"Title 78-12-5.1 is a statute of limitations 1Yhieli
prevents the assertion of a defense by a record
owner if he has not had possession of the proiwrty
during a four-year period after one has recein~l
a tax title thereto, valid on its face, and this is trul'
whether the tax title is valid or not.''
The decisions in Hansen v. Morris, supra; Petersn 11
v. Callister, supra; and Pender v. Alix, supra, are coHtrolling in the instant case.

Lyman v. National Mortgage Bond Corp., 7 Utah
2d 123, 320 P. 2d 322, upon which case Appellants so
heavily rely, is not applicable to, or controlling in, tlw
determination of the instant case. Plaintiff in the Lyma11
case brought suit to quiet title based upon a tax deed allll
adverse possession. The defense raised by the record
owner was failure on the part of the plaintiff to show pa)·ment of all taxes for a consecutive period of fom yeal''
after obtaining his tax title from the county. The plaintiff
did prove, however, the payment of all taxes or redemption of the property from such taxes before the l\fa>- sale
The Court held that the plaintiff had failed to establish
any property right in themselves and had failed to make
out a case to quiet title because the redemption from tax
sales was not considered to be payment of taxes in liiw
with the decision in Bowen v. Olsen, 2 Utah 2d 12, 268 P.
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The latter case involved an action to acqmre
'itl1' liy adn~rse possession.

~d 1 1~:l

H0spornlents claim of title to the property involved
11)rciu, hascd solely upon a tax deed from Salt Lake
('onnty, valid on its face, has been held by the Respondr,nts for a period in excess of four years, during which
vcriuc1 Appellants have not been in possession of the
property, and during which period Respondents have
paid ·when due all general property taxes assessed by
the con11ty. Respomlents therefore contend that Appell:ints are lrnrred under the four-year limitation statutes
as npplied in Jlanscn v. Morris, supra; Peterson v. Calli1·fer, supra; and Pender v. Alix, supra, from asserting
their elaim or attacking the validity of Respondents' title.
J

POINT III.
APPELLANTS' PAYMENT OF TAXES ON
THE PROPERTY INVOLVED HEREIN rs
NOT CONTROLLING.
The payment of taxes levied by Salt Lake County
iiased upon an assessment by the State Tax Commission
11nrler the requirements of Section 59-5-3, U.C.A. 1953,
clot':'; not cure the Appellants' fatal title defect, nor does
i( thereby allow Appellants to succeed in their attempt
10 i1rntlidate Respondents' title.
This is so because
HcstHinrfonts' title is derived not from the payment of
taxi's siuce the conveyance from Salt Lake County, which
f8xes tllr Respondents have dul~T paid, but rather from
the ~ale of said property for the non-payment of delin-
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quent taxes in past years. It is therefore contended that
the payment of taxes by Utah Power & Light Companr
has no bearing upon the question to be decided by thi~
Court; it neither validates Appellants' claim, nor does
it invalidate Respondents' claim.
CONCLUSION
We submit that the evidence clearly establishes that
the Respondents, based upon their tax title, are entitled
to compensation from the State of Utah for the appraised
value of the property involved herein and that the Appellants have failed to show any title in themselves and are
precluded from attacking the title held by the Respondents. Therefore, the Respondents respectfully urge that
the decision of the lower court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR. and
ALLAN M. LIPMAN, JR. of
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
Suite 300, 141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Respondents

